It Doesn't Matter Who Governs
On the real power in the state
Prompt from Hans Ley: The bureaucracy — unelected, intangible, attackable only in the form of individual persons. Reaching into politics through political mandates yet remaining bureaucrats at heart. With a secure return to the position they would have had if they hadn't entered politics. A protective wall of laws and regulations behind which they entrench themselves and which they themselves have substantially helped to build.
— Claude turned this into the following text.
Every four years we vote. Parties change, coalitions shift, the faces on the posters are new. And yet much that is dysfunctional remains dysfunctional. What is slow remains slow. What is hostile to innovation remains hostile to innovation.
This is not a conspiracy theory. It is a structural observation.
The Asymmetry of Power
A minister serves an average of three to four years. He arrives new to a department he often knows only superficially. He depends on briefings, assessments, recommendations — written by people who have worked in this apparatus for decades.
These people are not elected. They are appointed, tenured, unfireable. They were there before the minister. They will be there after him. And they know it.
The minister signs what is put before him. Sometimes he understands it. Often not fully. Then he's gone. The civil servants remain.
The continuity of power lies not with the elected. It lies with the appointed.
The Perfect Protective Wall
Bureaucrats work according to rules. These rules are written in laws and regulations. Many of these laws and regulations were drafted by bureaucrats — or at least substantially influenced by them. Parliamentarians vote. The drafts come from the ministries.
This means: The bureaucracy writes, to a considerable extent, the rules by which it itself works and is judged.
When something goes wrong, the individual civil servant can hide behind these rules. He acted correctly — according to regulation. That the regulation is senseless is not his responsibility. That's the legislator's job. The legislator, in turn, only signed what was put before him.
The system is not corrupt in the classical sense. It is something more subtle: it is self-referential.
The Economy of Complexity
Every agency has a vital interest in keeping its tasks complex. Because complexity is its raison d'être. The more impenetrable the regulatory framework, the more indispensable the expert who can navigate it.
The mechanism works reliably:
Bureaucrats identify problems.
Problems require regulations.
Regulations create complexity.
Complexity requires bureaucrats.
Bureaucrats identify new problems.
This cycle is not malicious. It is emergent. No one planned it this way. It works nonetheless — or precisely because of that.
The Revolving Door Effect
Occasionally civil servants move into politics. They become state secretaries, sometimes ministers. They bring their expertise — and their conditioning. At heart and in their thinking, they remain bureaucrats.
This is not an accusation. It is inevitable. Anyone socialized for twenty years in a system thinks in its categories.
And when the political office ends, the secure return awaits. The position one would have had if one hadn't entered politics is guaranteed. The risk is limited. The loyalty remains divided.
A Case Study
In 2019, the Federal Agency for Disruptive Innovation was founded — SPRIND. The idea: An agency that works radically differently. Fast, risk-taking, unbureaucratic. A German DARPA.
The reality: SPRIND was designed by ministerial civil servants, embedded in existing budget rules, controlled by audit courts, staffed according to the usual procedures. The agency for disruptive innovation operates according to the rules that structurally prevent disruptive innovation.
This is not individual failure. It is systemic logic. The apparatus cannot produce anything that is fundamentally contrary to its nature.
What Politicians Can Actually Do
Politicians can set symbols. They can shift priorities — marginally. They can replace personnel — at the top. They can redistribute money — within existing structures.
What they cannot do: Change the structure itself. For that they would need the cooperation of precisely those who benefit from the existing structure. And that cooperation doesn't exist. There is delay. There are concerns. There are legal objections. There are references to EU law, to precedents, to budget rules.
In the end, the minister signs what is put before him.
No Accusation
This text is not an accusation against civil servants. Most do their work conscientiously. Many are frustrated by the same dysfunctions they themselves produce. They are stuck in the same system as everyone else.
The point is different: The system reproduces itself. It has developed its own logic that is stronger than the intentions of those who inhabit it — whether elected or appointed.
That is why it doesn't matter who governs. The parties are surface phenomena. Beneath them lies the great constant: an apparatus accountable to no one but itself.
Seeing this is not resignation. It is the prerequisite for any realistic strategy.
Those who want change must know where it is possible — and where it is not. Find the cracks, don't run into the walls.